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ABSTRACT: I assume that there exists a general phenomenon, the phenomenon of the 
explanatory gap, surrounding consciousness, normativity, intentionality, and more. Explanatory 
gaps are often thought to foreclose reductive possibilities wherever they appear. In response, 
reductivists who grant the existence of these gaps have offered countless local solutions. But all 
such reductivist responses have had a serious shortcoming: because they appeal to essentially 
domain-specific features, they cannot be fully generalized, and in this sense these responses have 
been not just local but parochial. Here I do better. Taking for granted that the explanatory gap is 
a genuine phenomenon, I offer a fully general diagnosis that unifies these previously fragmented 
reductivist responses. 
 
That we, like Descartes, can conceive of phenomenally unconscious physical 
duplicates of ourselves; that we, like Moore, can coherently ask whether what we 
desire to desire is truly good; that we, like Searle, can imagine an operator in a 
Chinese Room who lacks the slightest understanding of Chinese – I regard these 
facts, and many more, as mere instances of a general and philosophically pervasive 
phenomenon that I call the explanatory gap.1 Explanatory gaps are often thought 
to foreclose reductive possibilities wherever they appear. 
Here I set myself three tasks. First, I show that these familiar anti-
reductivist arguments based on explanatory gaps can be fitted to a common 
template. On the one hand, we have standard reductive claims, like the claim that 
water reduces to (say) H2O. Such reductive claims are entailed by an a priori 
conceptual truth stating a possible condition for what it is, essentially speaking, to 
be the entity in question, together with outside information of a certain limited 
kind telling us what meets that condition. In this sense, all standard reductive 
claims are transparent. On the other hand, we have gappy reductive claims – claims 
purporting to reduce the phenomenally conceived to the non-phenomenally 
conceived, the normatively conceived to the non-normatively conceived, and so 
on. What distinguishes these gappy reductions is that we are missing the relevant 
kind of a priori conceptual truths about essences.2 As a consequence, such 
reductions are never transparent. The anti-reductivist would have us conclude, by 
inference to the best explanation, that the gappy reductions are spurious (§1-§2). 
 Many reductivists have responded by denying the existence of the 
asymmetry, and thereby denying that explanatory gaps are real. Though I, too, 
                                                 
1 The term “explanatory gap” is of course most familiar from the phenomenal case and originates 
in Levine (1983). 
2 As I suggest in a later footnote, a similar argument template can be constructed using identity-
based rather than essence-based models of reduction. Identity-based models appear in Lewis 
(1972), Jackson (1996), and Chalmers (2012). 
2 
 
am a reductivist, I do not follow these thinkers. I concede the reality of the 
explanatory gaps without argument. 
Other reductivists have joined me in conceding the reality of the 
explanatory gaps, but unlike me, they offer one-off responses to the many 
explanatory gap arguments fitting the anti-reductivist’s template. For example, 
according to the phenomenal concept strategy, phenomenal concepts have 
peculiar semantic features that generate the phenomenal explanatory gap – 
perhaps these concepts are distinctively recognitional, indexical, or quotational.3 
According to the expressivist strategy, meanwhile, normative concepts are 
distinctively plan-laden or motivationally efficacious, and these peculiar semantic 
features generate the normative explanatory gap.4 And so on.  
Each of these peculiar semantic features is meant to exempt the referent of 
any concept with that feature from the otherwise sound anti-reductivist 
conclusion. Troublingly, however, no semantic feature on any of these lists is 
shared by every concept in every domain associated with an explanatory gap. 
Phenomenal concepts are not usually thought to be plan-laden or motivationally 
efficacious; normative concepts are not usually thought to be recognitional, 
indexical, or quotational. As formulated, then, these diagnoses are essentially 
piecemeal: they rule out the very possibility of a general reductivist diagnosis.5 
I aim to do better: my second task in this paper is to develop a fully general 
diagnosis of any explanatory gap (§3-§4). I say that every explanatory gap is the 
predictable symptom of a concept that is semantically basic. I therefore hold that 
any local semantic feature generates an explanatory gap only insofar as, and only 
because, a concept with that feature is basic. In this way, my diagnosis folds these 
previously fragmented strategies, as well as any yet-to-be-imagined strategies of 
the same type, into a single deep explanatory structure.6 
                                                 
3 Defenders of various incarnations of the phenomenal concept strategy include Loar (1990/1997), 
Hill and McLaughlin (1999), Carruthers (2000), Tye (2000), Perry (2001), and Papineau (2002). 
4 See Gibbard (1990) and (2003) and Blackburn (1993) and (1998). Of course, expressivism has 
been thought attractive for certain other reasons as well. Arguably, for example, it explains the 
motivational significance of normative beliefs.  
5 Two versions of the phenomenal concept strategy are piecemeal, but not essentially so. First is 
the view, due to Hawthorne (2002) and Braddon-Mitchell (2003), that phenomenal concepts are 
conditional concepts, referring to certain non-physical properties if these exist and otherwise 
referring to physical properties. Though this diagnosis can perhaps be fully generalized, it is 
incompatible with my own. I reject it for reasons discussed in fn. 33. 
 A second generalizable version of the phenomenal concept strategy is due to Yetter-
Chappell and Chappell (2013), who hold that phenomenal concepts are inferentially isolated from 
physical concepts and who extend the point to normative concepts. I believe that this diagnosis is 
right, insofar as it goes, but it remains to be seen whether this fact about inferential isolation is 
itself better explained in reductivist-friendly or anti-reductivist terms. Here I will argue for the 
former approach, as well as fully generalizing a strategy that Yetter-Chappell and Chappell see as 
covering only two cases. 
6 In Mehta (2013a), I develop this semantic diagnosis of the explanatory gap surrounding 
phenomenal consciousness. Here I fully generalize that solution, with updates as necessary along 
the way. The closest anticipation of my diagnosis appears in Levine (2010), who in passing makes 
the schematic point that basic phenomenal concepts suffice to explain the existence of the 
phenomenal explanatory gap. But besides not generalizing the point, Levine also explicitly rejects 
the existence of explanatory gaps, as characterized below, and hence rejects the diagnosis to be 
advanced here. 
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My third and final task is to show that this reductivist-friendly diagnosis 
is superior to the anti-reductivist alternative. I show that the anti-reductivist must 
accept my own diagnosis, while adding a further commitment: that every basic 
concept of a certain sort must refer to a metaphysically primitive entity. But this 
commitment, I argue, cannot do any explanatory work (§5). And while the anti-
reductivist might suggest that we cannot confirm or disconfirm reductive 
hypotheses without appeal to explanatory gaps, I show that there is no mystery 
about how else to proceed (§6). 
 
 
1. The profile of an explanatory gap 
 
As the ambition of this paper is general, I must operate primarily at a schematic 
level; I cannot properly treat any of the myriad particular explanatory gaps. Still, 
it is worth mentioning – very briefly – a few examples of the phenomenon. 
Attend to your current visual experience, focusing on what it is like for 
you to see the scene before you. Perhaps you see a shiny red apple and upon 
introspecting your experience you become aware of phenomenal redness. Now 
consider any theory reducing phenomenal redness to certain entities7 picked out 
purely via non-phenomenal concepts, such as neural firing patterns, contents of 
perceptual representations of your environment, or external perceptibles with 
which you are perceptually acquainted.8 Any such reduction of the phenomenally 
conceived with that conceived non-phenomenally will appear deeply dissatisfying. 
Even if some such reduction is correct, it is not clear how it could be correct. This 
is the phenomenal explanatory gap. 
Next consider a normative property such as goodness. Reflect on a range 
of philosophical theories reducing goodness to entities picked out purely via non-
normative concepts. Perhaps goodness is the greatest pleasure for the greatest 
number, or the property most conducive to the exercise of distinctively human 
capacities, or that property which would elicit the most approval under certain 
conditions that are specified using only non-normative concepts. Still, it 
apparently remains an open question whether something having the property in 
question is truly good.9 The question continues to seem sensible regardless of 
what further non-normative background knowledge we might possess. This is the 
normative explanatory gap. 
Turn next to intentional properties, such as the property of believing that 
snow is white. It may be thought that intentionality reduces to something 
conceived in purely non-intentional terms: perhaps to believe that snow is white 
                                                 
7 I use the term “entity” as a maximally permissive sortal, covering states, processes, events, 
objects, properties, relations, etc. 
8 These are the mental paint, representationalist, and naïve realist theories of phenomenal 
consciousness. For defenses of standard versions of these theories, see respectively Block (1996); 
Dretske (1995), Tye (1995), and Lycan (1996); and Campbell (2002), Martin (2002) and (2006), 
Sturgeon (2008), and Fish (2009).  
9 Moore (1903). There have been many contemporary attempts, varying greatly in their 
faithfulness to Moore, to revive the open question argument. See Horgan and Timmons (1991), 
Rosati (1995), Altman (2004), Strandberg (2004), Nuccetelli and Seay (2007), Bedke (2012), Pigden 
(2012), and Sutton (2014). 
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is simply to behave or be disposed to behave in certain ways, or to have internal 
states suitably causally related to one another, or to be suitably biologically 
constituted. But it remains mysterious exactly how any such reduction could be 
true – how believing that snow is white could come to nothing more than meeting 
a non-intentionally conceived condition.10 This is the intentional explanatory 
gap. 
It is noteworthy that these explanatory gaps persist even when one 
attempts to reduce the entity in question to certain metaphysically primitive entities, 
as long as these primitives are considered purely via concepts drawn from outside 
the relevant domain. We do not solve the problem by reducing phenomenal 
redness, goodness, or intentionality to certain configurations of primitive goo, 
unless the goo is itself conceptualized as being phenomenal, normative, or 
intentional.11 
Explanatory gaps abound in philosophy. There are, I suspect, similar 
explanatory gaps surrounding the self, space, time, causation, and more. But I will 
stick to discussing just two central instances, namely the phenomenal and 
normative explanatory gaps. Because these instances are superficially very 
different, it will be instructive to see that they share a deep structure, and it is a 
characterization of this structure rather than an inventory of its instances that is 
sought here. 
We will need some terminology to frame the discussion. Think of a 
concept as the mental analog of a word, and stipulate that a concept must at least 
be a concrete mental representation belonging to a subject.12 Then define a 
conceptual family as any group of concepts such that each concept in the group 
has suitably many conceptual connections to concepts within the group, but no 
concept outside the group has suitably many conceptual connections to concepts 
within the group. While this definition is imprecise, the intuitive idea is that a 
network of concepts amounts to a conceptual family in virtue of there being dense 
conceptual relations among the family members and sparse conceptual relations 
between family members and outsiders. We may leave open the possibility that a 
single concept may belong to multiple conceptual families, either nested or 
overlapping, as well as the possibility that a conceptual family may be as small as 
a single concept. 
In the core instances of the explanatory gap phenomenon, it is obvious 
which conceptual family is most salient. For phenomenal concepts will plausibly 
form a conceptual family, given the relative plenitude of conceptual connections 
among phenomenal concepts and the relative paucity of conceptual connections 
                                                 
10 I have mentioned behaviorism, functionalism, and the biological theory, respectively. Searle 
(1980) leverages the famous “Chinese room” thought experiment against functionalism, and the 
same argument obviously applies to behaviorism, as well. But Searle’s own biological theory seems 
no less mysterious – what has the content of belief to do with biology?   
11 See for comparison Lewis (1988) on phenomenal consciousness and Moore (1903) on 
normativity. 
12 The term “concept” is sometimes used instead to refer to an abstract entity which is a part, 
perhaps improper, of a proposition. That will not be my usage here. This matter is merely 
terminological, as those who use the term “concept” in this alternative sense should also concede 
the existence of concepts in the sense of this paper: something about us must explain our 
representational capacities. 
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between phenomenal and non-phenomenal concepts. For similar reasons, 
normative concepts will plausibly form another conceptual family. 
The two parties to the dispute are the reductivist and the anti-
reductivist, so let us next understand what divides them. Their dispute concerns 
the referents of the concepts within some given gap-generating conceptual family 
F. The basic issue is that the reductivist accepts, and the anti-reductivist denies, 
that any entity considered via a concept in family F will be susceptible to an 
interfamily reduction. Let me explain. 
I will work with an essentialist model of reduction.13 According to this 
model, x reduces to y just in case the essence of x – what it is to be x – is to be y. 
Symbolically, I will represent the claim that x reduces to y as x E y: the subscript 
“E” stands for “essence,” and the arrow pointing from y to x indicates that y is 
metaphysically prior to x. 
I am thinking of essences in a broadly Aristotelian way. (Throughout, 
when I speak of the essence of an entity, I am always referring to its complete 
essence and never merely to some proper part thereof.) To recall a familiar 
example: necessarily, something is Socrates just in case it is a member of the set 
whose only member is Socrates. Even so, it is not the case that what it is to be 
Socrates is to be a member of the set whose only member is Socrates; that does 
not characterize the essence of Socrates.14 
By using the essentialist model, we do justice both to the asymmetry and to 
the hyperintensionality of reduction. For suppose that water reduces to H2O. Then 
according to the present account, what it is to be water – the essence of water – is 
to be H2O. This treatment of reduction is asymmetric, for it is not true that what 
it is to be H2O is to be water; presumably, what it is to be H2O has something to 
do with protons, electrons, and the like. Our treatment is also hyperintensional. 
For if H2O happens to be my favorite chemical, then it is necessarily true that H2O 
is actually my favorite chemical – but it is not true that what it is to be water is to 
be my actual favorite chemical. Put symbolically: water E H2O, but ~(H2O E 
water), and ~(water E my actual favorite chemical). 
Since I am treating reduction as hyperintensional, I will find it useful to 
say that a concept of some entity x is essence-tracking just in case the subject 
who possesses that concept thereby has a grasp, perhaps implicitly, of some 
possible condition for what it is (completely) to be x. We will see some examples 
of essence-tracking concepts below, but whenever I discuss some reductive claim 
of the form x E y, I will normally assume that x and y are each considered via, 
and only via, their (complete) essences.15 
It is now tempting to define anti-reductivism about some domain 
corresponding to conceptual family F as the rejection of every attempted reduction 
of any entity considered via an essence-tracking concept in F. Tempting, but 
wrong, since an anti-reductivist about a domain may accept reductions within the 
                                                 
13 The thrust of what I have to say can be said even if we use an identity model of reduction. See 
fn. 24. 
14 I thus have in mind something like the understanding of essence introduced in Fine (1994a), and 
in particular what Fine (1994b) calls a constitutive essence. My model of reduction is inspired by 
Rosen (2010) and Fine (2015). 
15 I suspect that just about every concept is essence-tracking, but I will not rely on that idea here. 
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domain. An anti-reductivist about phenomenal consciousness might accept the 
reduction of phenomenal orangeness to some combination of phenomenal redness 
and phenomenal yellowness, and an anti-reductivist about normativity might 
likewise accept the reduction of what is good for a subject to what that subject has 
a certain kind of reason to desire. 
Better, then, to define anti-reductivism as follows. Say that for a claim of 
the form “x E y” to be an interfamily reductive claim is for x to be considered 
via some essence-tracking concept C belonging to conceptual family F and for y 
to be considered via its essence but solely via concepts outside family F. The claim 
is instead an intrafamily reductive claim if y is considered via at least one concept 
within family F. An anti-reductivist about some domain corresponding to some 
conceptual family F is then someone who rejects any interfamily reduction of any 
entity considered via any essence-tracking concept in F. By contrast, for every 
entity considered via an essence-tracking concept in F, a reductivist about the 
corresponding domain accepts some interfamily reduction of that entity.16 
Paradigms of the interfamily reductive claims in dispute between the reductivist 
and the anti-reductivist include the claims that phenomenal redness E such-and-
such neural firing pattern and that goodness for a subject E what the subject 
desires to desire. 
In this paper, I discuss only the anti-reductivist who wishes to defend her 
view by appeal to the explanatory gap phenomenon, as characterized below. I set 
aside without comment any anti-reductivist who would understand the 
explanatory gap phenomenon differently, as well as any anti-reductivist who does 
not appeal to explanatory gaps at all.  Let my opponent present her case, then.17 
She proposes that there is an asymmetry between standard reductive claims 
(whether inter- or intrafamily) and gap-generating reductive claims. In particular, 
she suggests, any standard reductive claim is, in a certain epistemic sense, 
transparent, while no gap-generating reductive claim is transparent in this sense. 
The best explanation for the asymmetry is that the gap-generating reductive 
claims are all false. This suggestion requires some unpacking. 
Begin with the definition of transparency. Consider some arbitrary entity 
x, considered via essence-tracking concept C belonging to family F. For the 
reductive claim that x E y to be transparent is for it to be the case that: 
 
(T1) Purely a priori conceptual information entails a possible condition for 
what it is to be x, and 
                                                 
16 It may appear that this distinction between reductivism and anti-reductivism is not exhaustive 
– mightn’t one think that some but not all entities considered via concepts in some family are 
susceptible to interfamily reductions? I think not: I would understand the notion of a conceptual 
family in such a way that this is impossible. As support for this idea, notice how unusual it is to 
hold that some but not all phenomenal entities can be reduced to entities conceived purely non-
phenomenally, or that some but not all normative entities can be reduced to entities conceived purely 
non-normatively. Should that seem to be the case – e.g., if we want to distinguish genuinely 
normative reasons from merely institutional “reasons” – presumably we should say that the entities 
apparently susceptible to interfamily reduction are not actually phenomenal or normative after all. 
17 I do not intend the argument to be presented on the anti-reductivist’s behalf to be mere exegesis 
of any actual anti-reductivist proposal, though it has close connections to many such proposals. 
Rather, I regard the argument as the best general version of an anti-reductivist argument based 
on the phenomenon of the explanatory gap. 
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(T2) full a priori or a posteriori information, not considered via any concept 
from family F, entails that some entity y meets those conditions.18 
 
Let us take the reductive claim that water E H2O as our paradigm of a 
transparent reductive claim.19 Suppose that the ordinary concept of water belongs 
to a small family of concepts that includes the concept of the aquatic and the 
concept of hydration. Arguably, it is an a priori conceptual truth that if there is a 
single kind of entity y that actually plays the water role – e.g., that is transparent 
and odorless, that fills the rivers and the lakes, that causes me to have certain 
experiences, and so on – then water E y. If this is indeed an a priori conceptual 
truth, then the concept of water is an essence-tracking concept: the subject who 
possesses the concept of water thereby has a grasp of some possible condition for 
what it is to be water. So condition (T1) is satisfied. 
Further, it is plausible that given full a priori or a posteriori information not 
considered via any concept in the water family, it follows that there is a single kind 
of entity, namely H2O, that actually plays the water role. For start with all 
microphysical truths, considered via the concepts of completed physics. These will 
contain or entail information about the distribution and behavior of H2O, 
including the information that H2O is located in certain regions and behaves 
dynamically in certain ways. Then add all phenomenal truths, which will further 
entail that H2O looks, tastes, and feels like water. Also add indexical truths 
identifying, for example, who and where I am. These will rule out the possibility 
that, say, water is XYZ rather than H2O, as it will entail that the stuff that causes 
me to have experiences as of water, and that is distributed a certain way in my 
environment, is H2O rather XYZ. Finally, add a totality truth to the effect that 
the world is a minimal world meeting the previous description. This will 
guarantee that H2O is the only kind of entity that plays the water role. Yet none 
of the information required for this entailment needs to be considered via any 
concept in the family of water concepts. So condition (T2) is satisfied. 
Thus, the anti-reductivist suggests, the claim that water E H2O is 
transparent. For a priori conceptual information gives us a possible condition for 
what it is to be water, and full information considered without the use of any 
concept in the water family then entails that H2O meets that condition.20 Notice 
also that the claim that water E H2O is an interfamily reductive claim. Thus, 
even the boldest and most systematic anti-reductivist should have no general 
opposition to interfamily reductive claims; she should oppose interfamily 
reductive claims only in certain domains. 
                                                 
18 Strictly speaking, we should relativize this entailment to some conceptual family F, since we 
have left open the possibility that a concept may belong to multiple conceptual families. I leave 
this relativization implicit below. 
19 The claim that water E H2O may be an oversimplification (see Leslie (2013)), but the 
oversimplification is harmless with respect to the basic point here. My subsequent treatment of 
this reductive claim is taken almost directly from Chalmers (1996) and (2012), Jackson (1998), and 
Chalmers and Jackson (2001); the key differences are made explicit in a later footnote. I also draw 
freely on my earlier discussion of the example in Mehta (2013a). 
20 But for skepticism that this claim is transparent, see Block and Stalnaker (1999), Byrne (1999), 
Levine (2001), Papineau (2011), Diaz-Leon (2011), and Schaffer (forthcoming). 
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For, she may argue, transparency is notably absent for all interfamily 
reductive claims in domains which generate explanatory gaps. 
Return first to any attempt to reduce something conceived phenomenally 
to entities conceived purely non-phenomenally. All phenomenal concepts, the 
anti-reductivist may assume, form a family. But we do not have the kinds of a priori 
conceptual truths that we need to underwrite transparent interfamily reductions. 
After all, certain phenomenal entities – such as phenomenal redness and 
greenness, perhaps –are not associated with any a priori conceptual truths at all 
stating possible conditions for what it is to be those entities. Other phenomenal 
entities, meanwhile, arguably are associated with a priori conceptual truths stating 
possible conditions for what it is to be those entities: perhaps it is an a priori 
conceptual truth that what it is to be phenomenal orangeness is to be the kind of 
entity that is related in certain ways to phenomenal redness and phenomenal 
yellowness. The trouble here, however, is that all of these a priori conceptual 
truths must themselves be considered using at least one other concept in the 
phenomenal family. 
So no matter how much information we possess that is considered purely 
via concepts outside the phenomenal family, this information will not entail that 
some entity y meets the conditions laid out by these a priori conceptual truths. 
Either there will be no a priori conceptual truth of the right form, or there will be 
such a truth, but it will be possible to consider that truth only if we use other 
phenomenal concepts. A priori conceptual information alone never lets us break 
out of the phenomenal family. And that is why we find it perfectly conceivable that 
there might be worlds just like ours in all non-phenomenal respects, but in which 
our counterparts have no phenomenal experiences.21,22 
Or return to the normative domain. Any normative concept, the anti-
reductivist may reasonably assume, belongs to a family that includes both “thin” 
normative concepts, such as the concept of goodness and the concept of a reason, 
as well as “thick” normative concepts, such as the concepts of bravery and 
generosity. Some normatively conceived entities – certain reasons, perhaps – are 
not associated with any a priori conceptual truths stating possible conditions for 
what it is to be those entities. All other normatively conceived entities, meanwhile, 
are associated with a priori conceptual truths of the right kind. Perhaps, for 
example, it is an a priori conceptual truth that for something to be good for a 
subject is for there to be a certain kind of reason for her to desire it. But every such 
truth can be considered only if we use at least one concept in the normative family.  
                                                 
21 It may appear that some relevant truth about reference, such as the (putative) truth that the 
concept of phenomenal redness refers to such-and-such neural firing pattern, permits such an 
entailment. But this appearance is misleading. For reflect on how the concept of phenomenal 
redness is to be considered in a thought entertaining this claim. If the concept is considered as the 
concept of phenomenal redness, then considering this claim will use the very concept of phenomenal 
redness, which is not permitted. If on the other hand the concept is considered in some way that 
does not require the use of phenomenal concepts, then consideration of this truth is permitted but 
will not entail anything interesting about phenomenal redness conceived as such, and hence will 
not entail that phenomenal redness (conceived as such) E such-and-such neural firing pattern.  
22 Some would defend the transparency of interfamily reductive claims even in the phenomenal 
case. See Lewis (1966), Lormand (2004), Jackson (2007), Fish (2008), and Sundström (2017). I 
believe that McGinn (1991) would also defend transparency in this case, though he doubts that 
human beings are equipped to understand the relevant entailment. 
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So no matter how much information we have considered via concepts 
outside the normative family, this information will not entail that some entity y 
meets the conditions laid out by these a priori conceptual truths about normative 
essences. That is why we find it sensible to ask, “This is what I desire to desire, 
but is it truly good?” 
The normative case does present one important complication: there are 
arguably many a priori conceptual truths linking normativity to conditions that 
can be considered via purely non-normative concepts. For example, it is arguably 
an a priori conceptual truth that if an act involves killing a person purely for sport, 
then that act is morally wrong. Such truths might seem superficially similar to the 
essentialist a priori conceptual truths required for a transparent reduction. 
But there is a profound difference: these normative truths, rather than 
stating possible conditions for what it is to be (e.g.) wrong, just state metaphysically 
necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the property of being morally wrong to be 
instantiated. That is not enough to underwrite a transparent reduction, since we 
can know that moral wrongness is instantiated without knowing what moral 
wrongness is.23  
This difference explains why we continue to find it mysterious how it could 
be that, e.g., goodness E what I desire to desire, even if we become convinced that 
goodness and what I desire to desire have functional profiles that are identical in 
all non-normative respects. For we cannot rule out the possibility that (i) 
necessarily, something is good just in case the subject desires to desire it, but (ii) 
being good and being what I desire to desire are distinct properties.24  
Thus, the differences between the phenomenal and normative explanatory 
gaps are merely superficial. For in both domains, and arguably in many other 
domains as well, we must confront a difficult question: given that all typical 
reductive claims are transparent, why are there no transparent interfamily 
reductive claims in these gap-generating domains? The best explanation, 
according to the anti-reductivist, is that all gap-generating reductive claims – 
indeed, all reductive claims that are not transparent – are simply false.25 
                                                 
23 If there are a priori conceptual truths stating possible conditions, graspable via purely non-
normative concepts, for what it is to be good, what it is to be a reason, etc., then there simply is no 
normative explanatory gap, and all appearances to the contrary are due to our lack of appreciation 
of these a priori conceptual truths. 
24 This point goes through even if we accept an identity-based model of reduction. The point would 
then be that an a priori conceptual truth might yield a non-normatively conceived condition under 
which a normative property is instantiated, but it will not yield a non-normatively conceived 
condition under which a property is identical to a normative property. 
Thus I oppose those who take explanatory gaps to support anti-reductivism in the 
phenomenal case, but not in the normative case (see Chalmers and Jackson (op. cit.)). I also regard 
this point as the normative anti-reductivist’s best response to reductive normative functionalism, 
as developed by Jackson and Pettit (1995, p. 28); perhaps the point also targets Smith (1994) as 
well, though I am uncertain whether his normative functionalism is in fact reductive. 
25 It is sometimes said in response that an explanatory gap arises in any Frege case, and so the 
explanatory gap argument cannot reasonably be taken to undermine gappy reductive claims. (See 
the response of Schroeder (2007) to the open question argument, for example; the nuanced 
conclusions of Kalderon (2004) are also in this vicinity.) Arguably, however, the explanatory gap 
argument as formulated here avoids such concerns. Compare Chalmers and Jackson (2001, pp. 354-
356). 
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In sum, wherever the anti-reductivist finds an explanatory gap, she can 
wield an argument fitting this template: 
 
(EGA1) Every standard reductive claim is transparent. 
(EGA2) For any entity x, considered via some essence-tracking concept 
C in family F, no interfamily reductive claim of the form x E 
y is transparent. 
(EGA-C)  Therefore, every such interfamily reductive claim is false.26 
 
The conclusion is intended as an inference to the best explanation from the 
asymmetry identified in premises (EGA1) and (EGA2). 
 
 
2. Clarifications of the argument; possible responses 
 
It is important to note that we do not have an explanatory gap every time that an 
entity fails to figure in any transparent interfamily reductive claim. Suppose, for 
example, that the concept of a quark is much like the concept of water. In 
particular, suppose that it is an a priori conceptual truth that if there is a single 
physical kind of entity that plays a certain theoretical role – the quark-role – then 
what it is to be a quark is to be an entity belonging to that kind. Now, it might 
just turn out that quarks are metaphysically primitive. That is, it might just turn 
out there is a single physical kind of entity that plays the quark role, but that kind 
of entity is just a quark. Then any attempt to reduce quarks transparently – indeed, 
any attempt to reduce quarks at all – is bound to fail. 
But this would not be an instance of an explanatory gap, since the failure 
would be purely a posteriori. In these kinds of cases, the first stage required for a 
transparent interfamily reduction is successful: there is an a priori conceptual truth 
stating a possible condition for what it is to be the entity in question, where that 
condition can be considered using only concepts outside family F. The reduction 
fails only at the second stage – the stage at which we gather information considered 
via concepts outside the relevant family – for it turns out that there is no entity 
meeting the possible condition that we gathered in the first stage. But it was 
perfectly a priori possible that the second stage would be successful; it just so 
happened that it was not. 
What is distinctive about a gap-generating entity is that attempted 
interfamily reductions of it fail to be transparent at the first stage – the a priori 
conceptual stage. In particular, with a gap-generating entity x considered via 
concept C in family F, there is no a priori conceptual truth stating a possible 
condition for what it is to be x, where that condition can be considered using only 
                                                 
26 Note that (EGA1) should not be replaced with the claim that every true reductive claim is 
transparent. For while the argument would then be deductively valid, it would also beg the 
question against the reductivist, who holds that many true reductive claims are not transparent. 
Levine (2010) and (2014) notes the circularity of an argument concerning phenomenal 
consciousness fitting this template and attributes the circular argument to Chalmers and Jackson 
(2001). Setting aside questions of Chalmers-Jackson exegesis, I agree with him about the 
circularity of the argument he discusses and hence believe that the argument template in the text 
is much more dialectically effective. 
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concepts outside family F. This will occur either (i) because there are no a priori 
conceptual truths stating possible conditions for what it is to be an x at all, or (ii) 
because there are such truths, but each of them can be considered only via some 
concept in family F. That is what it is for an entity to generate an explanatory 
gap. This definition is purely stipulative; the term “explanatory gap” has been 
given other definitions which should not be confused with this one.27 
How can the reductivist resist the anti-reductivist’s explanatory gap 
argument? One option is to reject one of the argument’s two premises. If the 
reductivist rejects (EGA1) while granting (EGA2), then she says that even some 
standard reductions are not transparent. If she rejects (EGA2) while granting 
(EGA1), meanwhile, then she claims that there are transparent reductions not 
only in standard domains, but also in the allegedly gappy domains.28 
Reductivists who offer these two responses endorse very different models 
of reduction. Nonetheless, they agree that the anti-reductivist simply fails in her 
attempt to identify a principled asymmetry between standard reductive claims and 
gappy reductive claims. In other words, they deny that the very existence of the 
explanatory gap phenomenon, as I am using that term. In my view, however, the 
explanatory gap phenomenon is genuine; like anti-reductivist opponent, I accept 
(EGA1) and (EGA2). I make no attempt to defend that approach here but simply 
take it as a working assumption. 
Thus I am left with only one response: I must contest the inference to the 
anti-reductivist conclusion. The anti-reductivist says that her conclusion best 
explains the explanatory gap phenomenon. I say that the phenomenon admits of 
a better explanation – in particular, a purely semantic explanation. 
As I have already stated, whereas previous versions of this response have 
been essentially piecemeal, mine will be fully general. I first introduce a neutral 
semantic framework (§3), from which I extract a purely semantic, reductivist-
friendly diagnosis of the explanatory gap phenomenon (§4). Although the anti-
reductivist will be tempted to supplement this semantic diagnosis with a further 
metaphysical one, I show that we should resist this temptation (§5-§6). 
                                                 
27 The anti-reductivist faces one minor complication having to do with indexical concepts – 
concepts expressed with words like “I,” “now,” and “this.” Suppose that these form a conceptual 
family, or at least a small cluster of conceptual families (the personal-indexical family, the 
temporal-indexical family, the demonstrative-indexical family, etc.). It is a familiar point from 
Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) that any such family of concepts will generate an explanatory gap: 
there is no a priori conceptual truth stating a possible condition on what it is to be me, or to be this 
(demonstrated object), in a way that we can conceive without using any concept in the relevant 
family. But in at least some of these cases, we feel no resistance to interfamily reductions – certainly 
not in the case of ordinary material objects picked out via demonstrative concepts, for example. 
It is standard for the anti-reductivist to concede that in these special cases, the explanatory 
gap argument template fails: there is an explanatory gap, but interfamily reductions may still be 
had. Of course, if the explanatory gap argument template is to be safely used in other cases, then 
the anti-reductivist owes a principled distinction between indexical cases and phenomenal, 
normative, and other cases. However, since I see many potential ways that the anti-reductivist 
might meet these requirements, I propose to simply concede that there is some such account to be 
had without fussing over its details. See Chalmers (2004, pp. 186-7) for one possible approach. 
28 She should not reject both premises; that response is plainly mad. It entails that phenomenal and 
normative reductive claims are transparent, while reductive claims about water are not. See 
previous footnotes for many examples of those who would reject either (EGA1) or (EGA2) in the 
phenomenal and normative domains. 
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3. A minimal semantic framework 
 
I will in this section develop a minimal semantic framework that we can use to 
understand the explanatory gap phenomenon. I call the semantic framework 
minimal because, as I will argue, it should be accepted by any theorist, whether she 
is a reductivist or an anti-reductivist, and indeed whether she accepts or rejects 
the existence of explanatory gaps. The core idea is to divide all concepts into basic 
and non-basic concepts. Roughly speaking, for a concept to be non-basic is for it to 
link to its referent by first linking to one or more other concepts; in this sense a 
non-basic concept is semantically dependent. Roughly speaking, for a concept to 
be basic is for it to link to its referent without conceptual intermediary; in this 
sense a basic concept is semantically independent. 
Let us make all of this precise. Say that for some concept C to semantically 
depend on concepts C1 … Cn at time t is for the following two elements to ground 
the reference of concept C: first, a certain privileged psychological relation 
between concept C and concepts C1 … Cn at time t, and second, the extensions of 
C1 … Cn at time t. So as to leave the present framework compatible with the widest 
possible range of semantic theories, I will remain neutral about the precise 
character of the relevant privileged psychological relation. But perhaps the 
concept of a bachelor semantically depends in this way on the concepts of being a 
man and of being unmarried. 
I intend for the notion of grounding used to characterize semantic 
dependence to denote a metaphysical “in-virtue-of” relation. I therefore make two 
further assumptions. 
The first assumption imposes a “no-junk” condition on semantic 
dependence. To return to our example, from the fact that the concept of a bachelor 
semantically depends on the concepts of being unmarried and being a man, it 
should not follow that the concept of a bachelor semantically depends on the 
concepts of being unmarried, being a man, and being a lizard – the concept of 
being a lizard is junk. To be precise, the first assumption is that semantic 
dependence is non-monotonic: if C semantically depends on concepts C1 … Cn at 
time t, it does not follow that at time t that C semantically depends on the concepts 
in any group which includes C1 … Cn. 
The second assumption imposes a “no-circles” condition on semantic 
dependence. The idea is that if we start from some concept C and trace the chain 
of semantic dependence, we will never arrive back at C. To be precise, the second 
assumption is that semantic dependence is group asymmetric: if concept C 
semantically depends on concepts C1 … Cn at time t, then at time t none of the 
concepts C1 … Cn may semantically depend on any group of concepts which 
includes C; nor may any concepts on which C1 … Cn semantically depend 
themselves semantically depend on any group of concepts which includes C; and 
so on. It follows from the second assumption that no concept semantically depends 
on itself. 
We may now partition all concepts according to whether or not they stand 
in semantic dependence relations. For a concept to be non-basic at a certain time 
is for it to semantically depend on at least one of the subject’s other concepts at 
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that time, while for a concept to be basic at a certain time is for it not to 
semantically depend on any of the subject’s other concepts at that time. In a 
metaphor: the reference of a non-basic concept flows through other concepts to 
the world, while the reference of a basic concept flows directly to the world 
without conceptual intermediary. Bear in mind, though, that a concept’s non-
reference-determining relations to other concepts are not germane to its status as 
basic or non-basic. 
The minimal semantic framework entails an important consequence: any 
subject must possess some basic concepts, at least if her stock of concepts is finite. 
Proof: pick any subject with finitely many concepts and list all of her concepts. 
Then iterate the following procedure: ask whether the concept at the top of the 
list semantically depends on any other concepts. If it does not, then stop. If it does, 
then remove it from the list, pick any concept on which it semantically depends, 
and move that concept to the top of the list. 
Since the list is finite, the procedure is sure to halt. And when it does the 
concept that tops the list must be a basic concept: that concept cannot semantically 
depend on any concept(s) remaining on the list, since then the procedure would 
not have halted, nor can it depend on any concept(s) previously removed from the 
list, since semantic dependence is group asymmetric. This result should come as 
no surprise. Any genuine referential link must ultimately make contact with the 
world. It cannot be conceptual mediation all the way down. 
I turn now to a defense of the minimal semantic framework. The 
framework rests on just two assumptions about semantic dependence: a “no-junk” 
condition and a “no-circles” condition. These are deeply plausible assumptions 
about grounding in general, and hence about semantic dependence in particular. 
The assumptions might fail to hold in a few exotic cases – might there be a God 
who metaphysically depends on Herself? – but semantic dependence is not an 
exotic case.29,30 
One might reject the minimal semantic framework because one 
misunderstands what follows from it: 
1. One might think that all concepts are basic. Yet apparently the minimal 
semantic framework says otherwise.  
Not so. The minimal semantic framework entails that at least some 
concepts (of any subject with finitely many concepts) are basic. It does not entail 
that any concepts are non-basic. 
2. One might think that there are no stable definitions. Yet if any concepts 
are non-basic, then apparently the non-basic concepts must have stable definitions.  
Not so. For one thing, perhaps a single non-basic concept might 
semantically depend on different concepts at different times, while maintaining 
the same referent throughout. For another, perhaps a single concept might be 
                                                 
29 For sympathetic discussion of the possibility of circles of grounding, see Bliss (2014). 
30 And even if the assumptions are rejected, the theorist who acknowledges the existence of 
explanatory gaps will need to accept some semantic framework in the vicinity to account for the 
existence of the a priori conceptual truths about essences to which she is committed. In particular, 
this alternative framework, like the one I have presented, must take on a semantic commitment to 
conceptual links and (as will be discussed below) an epistemic commitment to the apriority of those 
links. I therefore suspect that an anti-reductivist who champions any plausible alternative 
framework of this sort will encounter objections analogous to the ones I will raise below. I will 
not attempt to vindicate this suspicion here. 
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non-basic at one time and basic at another time – again, while maintaining its 
referent throughout. And even if we focus on a non-basic concept at a single time, 
we need not think of the concepts on which it semantically depends as defining it, 
in any traditional sense. 
3. One might think that there is only a single reference relation R. Yet if 
we admit both basic and non-basic concepts, then apparently we must also admit 
at least two distinct reference relations: one between basic concepts and their 
referents, and another between non-basic concepts and their referents. 
Not so. There might be only a single reference relation R even in this case. 
It just must be that what makes it the case that a concept bears R to its referent 
depends on whether or not the concept is basic. If the concept is non-basic, then it 
must bear R to its referent because it stands in certain relations to other concepts (which 
bear R to various referents of their own); while if the concept is basic, then it must 
bear R to its referent for other reasons. 
4. One might think that two or more concepts can have their reference 
fixed jointly. Indeed, one might accept the total holist view that all of our 
concepts have their reference fixed jointly. Yet these views apparently violate the 
second assumption of the minimal semantic framework, the assumption of group 
asymmetry.  
Not so! For suppose that certain concepts C1…Cn have their reference fixed 
jointly. If we are to maintain the second assumption, then we cannot say, e.g., that 
C1 semantically depends on C2…Cn and that C2 also semantically depends on C1, 
C3,…Cn. But we may instead say that the reference of each of these concepts is 
determined by a certain privileged relation between that concept and the world, 
on the one hand, and a certain privileged relation between that concept and all of 
the subject’s other concepts, on the other hand. Interestingly, on this approach, 
none of the concepts C1…Cn has its reference determined solely by a privileged 
psychological relation to any group of the subject’s other concepts along with the 
extensions of those concepts. A certain relation between each of these concepts 
and the world is also required to fix its reference. As a consequence, all of these 
concepts end up being basic, and total holism is just one version of the view that 
all concepts are basic. But all of this remains compatible with our framework. 
The minimal semantic framework truly is minimal: its assumptions rest on 
deeply plausible metaphysical principles without unduly restricting the range of 
permissible semantic theories. I therefore urge reductivists and anti-reductivist 
alike to accept it.  
Let us see what follows. 
 
 
4. A semantic diagnosis of any explanatory gap 
 
The minimal semantic framework gives us enough traction to state the precise 
conditions under which an explanatory gap will arise. In particular, I will argue, 
an explanatory gap arises just in case there is an essence-tracking basic concept 
within the relevant conceptual family. 
We will need two tools before we make our diagnosis. First, we must note 
that any theorist who acknowledges the reality of explanatory gaps should accept 
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that semantic dependence relations underwrite the a priority of conceptual truths. 
E.g., those who acknowledge the reality of explanatory gaps should accept that if 
the concept of a bachelor semantically depends in a certain way on the concepts of 
being unmarried and being a man, then it is a conceptual truth that any bachelor 
is an unmarried man, and that conceptual truth is a priori because of these semantic 
dependence relations. For theorists who acknowledge explanatory gaps hold that 
there are many a priori conceptual truths about essences. Yet it is hard to see how 
that could be unless semantic dependence relations, which underwrite conceptual 
truths, also make those truths a priori. 
The second tool that we will need is the notion of a semantic dependence 
chain. Say that C stands in a semantic dependence chain to some group of concepts 
G just in case C semantically depends on G*, where we can get from G to G* by 
iterating the procedure, as many times as we like, of replacing one or more of the 
concepts in G with any concept that semantically depends on the replaced 
concept(s). To take a toy example, suppose that the concept of a bachelor 
semantically depends on the concepts of being unmarried and of being a man, and 
suppose further that the concept of being unmarried semantically depends on the 
concept of negation and the concept of being married. Then the concept of a 
bachelor stands in a semantic dependence chain to the concepts of negation, of 
being married, and of being a man. 
With these two tools in hand, we can determine exactly when an 
explanatory gap will arise. Recall that an entity x, considered via some essence-
tracking concept C in family F, generates an explanatory gap just in case there is 
no a priori conceptual truth, considered solely via concepts outside F, stating a 
possible condition for what it is to be x. So consider an arbitrary entity x, 
considered via some essence-tracking concept C in family F, that we hope to 
reduce. There are three possibilities. 
First possibility: C is a basic concept. 
If this first possibility obtains, then x will generate an explanatory gap. 
For if C is a basic concept, then there will be no concepts which determine the 
reference of C, and hence there will be no a priori conceptual truth stating a 
possible condition for what it is to be x. If the concept of phenomenal redness is 
essence-tracking and basic, for example, then no reductive claim of the form 
“phenomenal redness E y” will obey the standard model. 
One interesting consequence follows immediately: if explanatory gaps are 
real, then there must be some non-basic concepts. For standard reductive claims 
are not supposed to generate explanatory gaps, yet every basic concept will 
generate an explanatory gap. So it must be that for any standard reductive claim, 
the reduced entity is being considered via a non-basic concept. 
Second possibility: C is a non-basic concept, and C stands in a semantic 
dependence chain to some group of concepts G that includes no concepts from 
family F.  
If the second possibility obtains, then x will not generate an explanatory 
gap. For there will be an a priori conceptual truth stating a possible condition for 
what it is to be x, where this condition can be considered purely via the concepts 
in G – which, we have stipulated, are all outside family F. That is precisely what 
is required for there not to be an explanatory gap. 
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To return to our stock example, suppose that the concept of water belongs 
to the family of water concepts and stands in a semantic dependence chain to a 
group of concepts none of which belong to this family. The latter concepts might 
include the concepts used to consider the entity that actually plays the water role 
– the entity that is transparent and odorless, that fills the rivers and the lakes, that 
causes me to have certain experiences, and so on.31 Then it will be an a priori 
conceptual truth that (e.g.) if there is a single natural kind of entity y that actually 
plays the water role, then water E y. This possible condition for what it is to be 
water can moreover be considered solely via concepts outside the family of water 
concepts. 
I repeat that even if this second possibility obtains, there is still no 
guarantee that we will find a transparent interfamily reduction. For it is a priori 
possible that water is metaphysically primitive – in which case the single natural 
kind of entity that actually plays the water role would just turn out to be water. 
As I suggested earlier, certain cases might actually be like this: it might be that 
there is no explanatory gap surrounding quarks, but that quarks might 
nevertheless be metaphysically primitive. But if interfamily reductions do fail to 
be transparent in this way, then that failure will occur for purely a posteriori 
reasons having nothing to do with the explanatory gap phenomenon. Thus, if the 
second possibility obtains, then whether or not there actually turns out to be a 
transparent interfamily reduction, there is still no explanatory gap. 
 Third possibility: C is a non-basic concept, and any group of concepts to 
which C stands in a semantic dependence chain includes at least one concept from 
family F. 
If the third possibility obtains, then x will generate an explanatory gap. To 
be sure, there will be at least one possible condition for what it is to be x. For C 
stands in a semantic dependence chain to at least one group of concepts, and that 
fact will underwrite an a priori conceptual truth stating a possible condition for 
what it is to be x. However, in this third possibility, any group of concepts to which 
C stands in a semantic dependence chain includes at least one concept in family F. 
So all of these a priori possible conditions for what it is to be x must themselves be 
considered via at least one concept in family F. Thus, we might find a transparent 
intrafamily claim of the form x E y, but there will be no route to a transparent 
interfamily claim of that form. Moreover, the route will be blocked for purely a 
priori conceptual reasons. And that constitutes an explanatory gap. 
To return to some familiar possible examples: consider phenomenal 
orangeness, which perhaps can be transparently reduced to a certain combination 
of phenomenal redness and phenomenal yellowness, but which cannot be 
transparently reduced to any entities conceived purely non-phenomenally. Or 
consider goodness, which perhaps can be transparently reduced to what there is a 
certain kind of reason to desire, but which cannot be transparently reduced to 
anything conceived purely non-normatively. 
Note that if this third possibility obtains – if C is non-basic and any group 
of concepts to which C stands in a semantic dependence chain includes at least one 
                                                 
31 Or perhaps many of these concepts – the concepts of water, rivers, lakes, etc. – together stand in 
a semantic dependence chain to some distinct group of concepts. Then perhaps the concepts in that 
group help to simultaneously determine the reference of the concepts of water, rivers, lakes, etc. 
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concept from family F – then it must be that some concept within family F is basic. 
For if the chain of semantic dependence beginning with concept C were to bottom 
out in basic concepts that were all outside family F, then we would find ourselves 
in the second possibility rather than the third. If C is the concept of phenomenal 
orangeness, then these basic concepts might include the concepts of phenomenal 
redness and phenomenal yellowness; if C is the concept of goodness, then these 
basic concepts might include the concept of a reason. 
The minimal semantic framework therefore yields a precise diagnosis of 
the explanatory gap: 
 
The semantic diagnosis: Any entity x, considered via concept C in family 
F, generates an explanatory gap just in case there is some essence-tracking 
basic concept in family F.  
 
If the basic concept is C itself, as in the first possibility, then there can be no 
transparent reduction of x at all. If the basic concept is some concept other than C 
in family F, as in the third possibility, then there might be a transparent 
intrafamily reduction of x, but there cannot be a transparent interfamily reduction 
of x.  
 The semantic diagnosis is purely semantic. It is therefore reductivist-
friendly, as it has no metaphysical import whatsoever. And, I have argued, any 
theorist who accepts the reality of explanatory gaps should accept this diagnosis. 
Where does that leave the anti-reductivist? 
 
 
5. Anti-reductivist diagnoses 
 
The anti-reductivist, too, should accept this diagnosis – with a supplement. For 
she holds that any true reductive claim is transparent, and we have just seen that 
the referent of an essence-tracking basic concept can never be transparently 
reduced. Thus, the anti-reductivist is committed to the 
 
Semantics-metaphysics link: Any essence-tracking basic concept refers 
to a metaphysical primitive.32 
 
In this section I evaluate this principle. 
One immediate worry is that the semantics-metaphysics link rules out the 
possibility of phenomenal (or normative, intentional, …) gunk, i.e., a bottomless 
chain of phenomenal entities such that each entity reduces to phenomenal entities 
further down in the chain, but no entity in the chain reduces to anything 
considered via purely non-phenomenal concepts. Or at least the semantics-
metaphysics link rules out the possibility that our basic phenomenal concepts refer 
to any entity in such a bottomless chain. Yet even for the anti-reductivist this 
conclusion seems too strong: she wants to rule out certain kinds of interfamily 
reductions, but she may be perfectly content to allow for such (endless) intrafamily 
reductions. 
                                                 
32 Except for indexical concepts – see fn. 27. 
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 Still, some anti-reductivists may be willing to bite this bullet, and in any 
case we will eventually encounter an anti-reductivist proposal that avoids the 
worry entirely. So I will table this concern for now. 
Instead, I will press the following question: since the anti-reductivist is 
already committed to a semantic diagnosis of the explanatory gap phenomenon, 
what work is left for the semantics-metaphysics link to do? 
 
 
5.1. A conjoined explanation 
 
The simplest suggestion for the anti-reductivist is that the semantics-metaphysics 
link, together with the semantic diagnosis, is what explains the explanatory gap 
phenomenon. In other words, the suggestion is simply to conjoin the semantics-
metaphysics link to the semantic diagnosis. 
This suggestion can be briskly dismissed. For the semantics-metaphysics 
link is not explanatorily necessary. The purely semantic diagnosis, which is 
common to my account and the anti-reductivist’s, already explains the explanatory 
gap phenomenon in full. The semantics-metaphysics link is not even explanatorily 
helpful – it adds nothing of relevance to the explanation. But it is ontically 
pernicious: it forces the anti-reductivist to treat certain properties, including some 
phenomenal and normative properties, as primitive, whereas the reductivist would 
identify these with properties countenanced by all. Accepting the semantics-
metaphysics link, which is explanatorily idle but ontically inflationary, therefore 
leaves us with the worst of both worlds.33 
 
 
5.2. Explaining the existence of essence-tracking basic 
concepts 
 
But there is a better suggestion that the anti-reductivist might offer. She might 
agree with me that the semantic diagnosis by itself explains the explanatory gap 
phenomenon, while adding that the relevant semantic facts are themselves best 
explained in metaphysical terms. And that explanation might entail the semantics-
metaphysics link. In other words, in response to the question, “Why are there 
explanatory gaps in certain domains?” the anti-reductivist now gives the same 
answer that I give: “Because there are essence-tracking basic concepts in each of 
the associated conceptual families.” But the anti-reductivist sees a further question 
that deserves an answer: “Why do those conceptual families – e.g., the phenomenal, 
                                                 
33 It is for a similar reason that I hold that the explanatory gap phenomenon by itself lends no 
support to the alternative reductivist-friendly conditional concept diagnosis: the diagnosis that 
an explanatory gap is the symptom of a conditional concept (see fn. 5). To put tersely a point that 
deserves more discussion: a conditional concept cannot be basic, as its reference semantically 
depends on the concepts required to consider the relevant conditional. Hence any friend of the 
conditional concept diagnosis who accepts the assumptions of this paper must admit that essence-
tracking basic concepts also generate explanatory gaps. But, with this full account of the 
explanatory gap phenomenon already in hand, the conditional concept diagnosis is of no further 
help here. It must be defended on grounds independent of the explanatory gap phenomenon. 
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normative, and intentional families – include essence-tracking basic concepts?” So 
far I have given no answer to this question; the anti-reductivist wants to answer, 
“Because the essence-tracking basic concepts in those families all refer to 
metaphysical primitives.”34 
This anti-reductivist suggestion is much more promising than the last. It 
fills a genuine explanatory need, and in smart fashion. Before we evaluate it, 
however, let us get on the table an alternative, reductivist-friendly explanation for 
why we have the essence-tracking basic concepts that we do. 
I propose an explanation that is built around this core idea: our minds 
include many specialized non-conceptual systems each dedicated to a particular 
evolutionarily important task, as well as a centralized conceptual system for more 
general-purpose processing. (One might or might not want to understand the 
distinction between these two types of systems in terms of the distinction between 
modular and central processing.) For each specialized system, we will find a 
corresponding family of concepts in the central system – concepts that are at the 
interface between the two systems, so to speak.35 
Note well: I do not claim that every concept in such a family must be at the 
interface between the two systems, since we might use those concepts which are 
at the interface to form new concepts that are still in the family but that are no 
longer at the interface. Perhaps “thick” normative concepts, like the concepts of 
bravery and generosity, are like this. The idea is just that for every specialized 
system that interfaces with the central system, there will be a corresponding 
family of concepts. 
I further hypothesize that each conceptual family of this kind will include 
some essence-tracking basic concepts. In particular, I hypothesize that the 
essence-tracking basic concepts within the family will be those that happened to 
develop within the central system to allow it to exchange information with the 
specialized system. To predict which conceptual families will include essence-
tracking basic concepts, we should therefore look to the specialized systems that 
we happened to evolved. Here are some plausible candidates. 
First, we plausibly have a specialized perceptual system to detect various 
environmental and bodily features; correspondingly, we have a family of 
phenomenal concepts. Second, we plausibly have a specialized preference-governing 
system to propel us to action – to propel us to seek mates and ripe fruit and to avoid 
predators, for example; correspondingly, we have a family of normative concepts. 
Third, we plausibly have a specialized mind-reading system that ascribes 
psychological attitudes to others (and to ourselves), so that we can predict and 
respond to the behavior of others (and ourselves); correspondingly, we have a 
family of intentional concepts.36 
We now have two rival explanations for why we have the essence-tracking 
basic concepts that we do. The anti-reductivist explanation says that we have 
these essence-tracking basic concepts because of certain metaphysical facts, as 
encoded in the semantics-metaphysics link. The reductivist-friendly explanation 
says that we have these essence-tracking basic concepts because of contingent 
                                                 
34 I thank [name removed], [name removed], and an anonymous referee for bringing this anti-
reductivist idea to my attention. 
35 This proposal is inspired by Lormand (ms). 
36 Lormand (ms) develops these ideas in some detail. 
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facts about human psychology, as conditioned by evolutionary history. Which 
explanation is better? 
I see one clear advantage for the anti-reductivist explanation: it is more 
elegant. The anti-reductivist says that every essence-tracking basic concept 
corresponds to a metaphysical primitive. What a pretty picture she paints! The 
reductivist-friendly picture is pleasing, but not as pleasing as this one. 
But, I suggest, the anti-reductivist hypothesis does not score so well on 
other tests. Start with the test of independent plausibility: how plausible is each 
hypothesis independently of its ability to explain why we have the basic concepts 
that we do? The reductivist-friendly hypothesis has much independent 
plausibility, as this hypothesis rests on claims about psychology and evolutionary 
theory that have received ample empirical confirmation. The precise details of the 
proposal may need adjustment, but there are many ways of doing so without 
making any compromises in spirit. 
But compare the semantics-metaphysics link, which is a central 
commitment of the anti-reductivist hypothesis. According to the semantics-
metaphysics link, any essence-tracking basic concept must refer to a metaphysical 
primitive. At first blush, this idea might seem independently plausible, given that 
any metaphysically non-primitive entity must reduce to other entities. Suppose, 
then, that I form some essence-tracking concept C that refers to a metaphysical 
non-primitive. Arguably, since C is essence-tracking, it would have to track the 
reduced entity by tracking the reducing entities – in which case it will semantically 
depend on whichever other concepts track the reducing entities. But then C is not 
a basic concept. Q.E.D. 
This rationale is bad, however. Grant for the sake of argument that if an 
entity reduces to other entities, then an essence-tracking concept of the reduced 
entity must track it by being sensitive, somehow, to the presence of the reducing 
entities.37 It is still a mistake to think that this sensitivity to the reducing entities 
must occur conceptually rather than non-conceptually. To make the point concrete, 
suppose that the entity at issue is water, which reduces (say) to H2O. Now imagine 
a creature that just has brute non-conceptual mechanisms to detect hydrogen, 
oxygen, and chemical bonds. Whenever these mechanisms identify some 
substance as H2O, the creature applies its concept of water to that substance. This 
creature’s concept of water appears to be essence-tracking and yet basic: essence-
tracking, in virtue of the concept’s connection to non-conceptual mechanisms that 
detect the presence of hydrogen, oxygen, and chemical bonds; basic, in virtue of 
the concept’s reference being determined by its connection to these non-conceptual 
mechanisms and not by its connection to any other concepts. 
Once we realize that sensitivity to essences can be non-conceptual, we 
should recognize that the independent plausibility of the semantics-metaphysics 
link is low. 
There is another test worth applying to our two hypotheses: the test of 
parsimony. The reductivist-friendly hypothesis receives an excellent score on this 
test. After all, it simply recycles materials that have already been furnished by our 
best psychological theories. There is much that can be explained via the posit that 
our psychological capacities are the products of evolution, and more still that can 
                                                 
37 For the record, I reject this principle. 
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be explained via the posit that our psychologies include a centralized conceptual 
system as well as many specialized non-conceptual systems. The reductivist-
friendly hypothesis simply gives new work to these old posits. By contrast, the 
anti-reductivist hypothesis is notably profligate. The anti-reductivist hypothesis 
commits us to an abundance of fresh primitives – phenomenal primitives, 
normative primitives, and so on. That makes for a poor score on the parsimony 
test. 
In sum, I find the anti-reductivist hypothesis lacking in independent 
plausibility and lacking in parsimony. These lacks are great; they are not to be 
outweighed by a small gain in elegance. Between our two contenders, then, I judge 
the reductivist-friendly hypothesis to be the clear winner. 
 
 
5.3. Idealizing the semantics-metaphysics link 
 
At this point, the anti-reductivist may want to try a more radical change in tactics. 
Thus far, we have been evaluating the 
 
Semantics-metaphysics link: Any essence-tracking basic concept must 
refer to a metaphysical primitive. 
 
This principle posits a link between facts about metaphysics and facts about our 
actual conceptual schemes. But perhaps the anti-reductivist will think it better to 
link facts about metaphysics to facts about ideal conceptual schemes, like so: 
 
Idealized semantics-metaphysics link: Within any ideal conceptual 
scheme, any essence-tracking basic concept must refer to a metaphysical 
primitive.38 
 
The idea would be that meeting this condition is part of what it is for a conceptual 
scheme to be ideal, in the relevant sense. If we like, we may add further stipulations 
about the ideal in question: we may stipulate that within any ideal conceptual 
scheme, there must be a one-to-one mapping between metaphysical primitives and 
essence-tracking basic concepts; similarly, we may stipulate that within any ideal 
conceptual scheme, there must be a one-to-one mapping between (reasonably 
natural?) metaphysical non-primitives and essence-tracking non-basic concepts. 
The move to ideal conceptual schemes solves the problem of independent 
plausibility: it is independently plausible that within any ideal conceptual scheme, 
any essence-tracking basic concept must refer to a metaphysical primitive. For a 
conceptual scheme that fails to meet this condition thereby fails to count as ideal, 
in the present sense of that term. The move to ideal conceptual schemes also lets 
the anti-reductivist agree with me that for creatures like us, facts about which 
essence-tracking concepts are basic are to be explained in psychological and 
evolutionary terms. But these considerations are not obviously relevant to 
understanding which essence-tracking concepts would be basic within any ideal 
conceptual scheme. The move to ideal conceptual schemes even lets the anti-
                                                 
38 [Name removed] made roughly this suggestion to me in conversation. 
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reductivist allow for the possibility of gunk that is phenomenal, normative, 
intentional, etc. For if there is (e.g.) phenomenal gunk, then arguably an ideal 
conceptual scheme would have to contain infinitely many phenomenal concepts, 
none of which would be essence-tracking and basic.39 
Unfortunately, however, recasting the dispute in terms of the idealized 
semantics-metaphysics link should give no comfort to the anti-reductivist. 
To appreciate why not, we must first properly locate the dispute between 
the reductivist and the anti-reductivist vis-à-vis this new linking principle. The 
dispute should no longer be understood as a dispute over the linking principle 
itself, for unlike the original semantics-metaphysics link, the idealized semantics-
metaphysics link is a tautology. An ideal conceptual scheme just is a conceptual 
scheme in which – perhaps among other things – every essence-tracking basic 
concept refers to a metaphysical primitive. (The anti-reductivist has made her 
linking principle plausible only by emptying it of content.) 
Thus, in relation to the idealized metaphysics-link, the dispute between the 
reductivist and the anti-reductivist must be located further down the line: the anti-
reductivist should assert that the ideal conceptual scheme must include essence-
tracking basic concepts for certain phenomenal entities, normative entities, etc., 
and the reductivist should deny this. 
But – and this is the pivotal question – what dialectically admissible 
evidence can the anti-reductivist give us for taking her view of what an ideal 
conceptual scheme would look like? I say that she has none. 
She cannot examine any pre-existing ideal conceptual schemes – we have 
none lying around. She cannot just point to facts about what is metaphysically 
primitive – those facts are precisely the ones at issue, so such assertions would 
shamelessly beg the question. And she cannot appeal to the fact that the 
explanatory gap phenomenon arises in certain domains for beings like us – we have 
already seen that this fact, which pertains to our actual conceptual schemes, is best 
explained by a reductivist-friendly hypothesis. 
So the idealized semantics-metaphysics link is true, but its truth does not 
help the anti-reductivist. The semantics-metaphysics link would help the anti-
reductivist, if only it were true; but according to our best explanatory hypothesis, 
it is not. 
 
 
6. An unsound objection 
 
So far I have met the anti-reductivist’s general explanatory gap argument with an 
equally general semantic diagnosis. Yet my diagnosis may appear to 
overgeneralize. We must be able to disconfirm false reductive claims and confirm 
true ones, but how are we to do so without appeal to explanatory gaps? 
                                                 
39 Incidentally, this might seem to pose a problem for my diagnosis of the explanatory gap in terms 
of essence-tracking basic concepts: arguably a phenomenal explanatory gap might yet arise within 
an ideal conceptual scheme like this, which contains infinitely many phenomenal concepts none of 
which are essence-tracking and basic. But there is no problem here: my diagnosis of the 
explanatory gap phenomenon is meant to apply only to creatures – like us – who have finitely 
many concepts. 
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 The question is pressing only if it is about reductive claims concerning 
gap-generating entities. After all, I have conceded for the sake of argument that all 
other reductions are transparent, just as the anti-reductivist claims. Still, the 
question stands: in these special cases, how is confirmation or disconfirmation to be 
had? 
 By perfectly ordinary means, I reply. To take a silly example, suppose I wish 
to show that the property of being good does not reduce to the property of being 
a teapot. Many simple arguments would suffice, such as the argument that some 
actions are good, but no actions are teapots. Or, shifting to a serious example, I 
might hypothesize that certain experiences (experiences of phenomenal redness, 
of phenomenal greenness, etc.) reduce to certain neural firing patterns. To support 
my hypothesis, I might first identify distinctive properties of and relations among 
these experiences – e.g., that experiences of phenomenal colors help explain some 
of my discriminatory capacities, that certain sorts of experiences of phenomenal 
redness and of phenomenal greenness are mutually exclusive, and that experiences 
of phenomenal redness are more similar to experiences of phenomenal orangeness 
than to experiences of phenomenal yellowness. I might then argue that the 
respective neural firing patterns have the same properties and stand in the same 
relations. In short, when evaluating a reductive claim involving the referent of an 
essence-tracking basic concept, we need only draw on garden-variety epistemic 
methods, including deductive argumentation, inference to the best explanation, 
and probabilistic reasoning.40 
 If anti-reductivism is to find support, it will be on the basis of these 
ordinary epistemic methods. It will not be on the basis of the explanatory gap 
phenomenon.  
 
  
7. Conclusion 
 
The explanatory gap phenomenon is general, I have assumed, and warrants a 
general diagnosis. The anti-reductivist and I each have one to offer. My diagnosis 
is purely semantic: I say that an explanatory gap is a symptom of an essence-
tracking basic concept within the relevant conceptual family, and nothing more. 
The anti-reductivist’s diagnosis is semantic-cum-metaphysical: she accepts my 
diagnosis, but adds that any essence-tracking basic concept must refer to a 
metaphysical primitive. My central conclusion is that the purely semantic 
diagnosis is clearly superior to its semantic-cum-metaphysical rival. 
 My purely semantic diagnosis is general. But it is also flexible. Because it 
lays down only one key constraint, the constraint that any gap-generating concept 
must be an essence-tracking basic concept, it is compatible with a wide range of 
reductivist proposals about what the referents are, and how they are secured, for 
phenomenal, normative, and other gap-generating concepts. The diagnosis is even 
compatible with the possibility that different essence-tracking basic concepts 
secure their referents in different ways: in a slogan, which I express with apologies 
to Tolstoy, perhaps all non-basic essence-tracking concepts are alike, but each basic 
essence-tracking concept is basic in its own way. When considering the phenomenal 
                                                 
40 See Mehta (2013b) and Mehta (2014), for example. 
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concept strategy, the expressivist strategy, and other strategies of the same ilk, 
we may therefore mix and match as we please to account for the peculiarities of 
each case. Yet this is not ad hoc: we do not appeal to the idiosyncrasies of these 
concepts, but only to a feature that they share, to explain why we find all of the 
explanatory gaps that we do. 
By offering the purely semantic diagnosis, I have thus not discarded the 
fragmented reductivist-friendly diagnoses of previous thinkers. Far from it! – I 
have attempted to forge these pieces into a seamless whole. 
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